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The single most frequently asked ques-
tion in the early days of the war against
Iraq was: where is the antiwar movement? 
Americans asked it of each other and were 
besieged by the question when they trav-
elled abroad. There was a war then and a
massive movement. There is a war now;
so where is the movement? Is there any or-
ganisation at all? What is its strength? What
are its positions? Each time I was asked to 
speak or write on this straightforward sub-
ject I would start by trying to say two things 
at once: the old movement wasn’t quite
the wonder of democracy-in-the-streets-
stopping-an-imperialist-war it is often
made out to be and, there is a movement 
now. Then I’d stop. Because I too feel my-
self pulled back in memory to a time when, 
for over a decade, it seemed that every day 
was filled with a communal sense of rage,
exchanged not in emails or blogs but di-
rectly in conversations, endless meetings,
newly launched journals. The politics of the 
antiwar movement merged with the ur-
gent cultural changes of the time: music,
dope, sex, contempt for ways of studying
and learning that had produced the wars
and injustices against which we protested. 
I can remember travelling across the coun-
try to meetings on state college campuses 
in the deep mid-West which I had expected 
to be sunk in some timewarp of the 1950s
and finding instead liberated zones in which 
we danced to the same music, smoked the 
same dope and had the same endless de-
bates over tactics and strategy. The com-
munity of protest that was established
in those years, however temporary, was
nevertheless real. The ties between stu-
dents and other groups opposing the war 
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– churches, some labour unions, long-established pacifist groups – were strong and seemed
to promise (although the language had not yet been invented) a strengthening of civil society. In 
short, before the revolution, everything was very beautiful. Of course, the beauty of this strong
antiwar movement rested solidly on the back of the ongoing prosecution of a war of exceptional 
length and brutality. And then too, we were all young, then. 
Having now discharged my own abiding nostalgia let me move to history, rather than memory. 
The Sixties – to use the general noun currently in use – were centrally about the recognition,
on the part of an ever growing number of Americans, that the country in which they thought
they lived – peaceful, generous, honourable, just – did not exist and never had. The emergence
of a more nuanced history of the US as opposed to the patriotic metanarrative taught in grade
school began not with the war but with the civil rights movement. Its criticisms of the US were
couched initially in the familiar rhetoric of the Cold War, but it quickly developed in new direc-
tions, introducing the country to a set of tactics, and the images that went with them, that raised
different questions: What was the nature of the federal government’s commitment to universal 
suffrage? Would it use federal troops to enforce equal rights for all its citizens? Questions about
contemporary racial arrangements led inevitably to historical ones and an uneasy recognition
of the contradictory nature of the entire national narrative, from the Founding Fathers to nation-
building in Vietnam.
Early on in the war, some leaders of the civil rights movement began to connect racial justice at 
home and the war abroad. Malcolm X, for example, denounced the war in December 1964 and,
before the year was out, he was joined by James Forman, executive secretary of the Student Non-
Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). In 1965, the McComb, Mississippi, branch of the Free-
dom Democratic Party explicitly called for draft resistance: “No one has a right to ask us to risk 
our lives and kill other Coloured People in . . . Vietnam so that the White American can get richer. 
We will be looked upon as traitors to the Coloured People of the world if Negro people continue to
fight and die without a cause . . . We can write our sons and ask if they know what they are fight-
ing for. If he answers Freedom, tell him that’s what we are fighting for here in Mississippi. And if
he says Democracy, tell him the truth – we don’t know anything about Communism, socialism, 
and all that, but we do know that Negroes have caught hell under this American democracy.”1
By 1967 Martin Luther King Jr had not only endorsed draft resistance, but had expressed an
unexpected empathy for the “desperate, rejected and angry young men” who had set ghettoes
from Watts to Washington, DC, on fire: “As I have walked among [them] I have told them that
Molotov cocktails and rifles would not solve their problems . . . But they asked – and rightly so
– what about Vietnam? . . . Their questions hit home, and I knew that I could never again raise
my voice against the violence of the oppressed in the ghettos without having first spoken clear-
ly to the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today – my own government.”2 A May 1967 
FBI report on the potential for racial violence in the summer of that year noted the link between 
the civil rights movement and anti-Vietnam War movement with considerable alarm: “King has 
now joined [Stokely] Carmichael [of SNCC], [Floyd] McKissick [of the Congress of Racial Equal-
ity], and other civil rights extremists in embracing the communist tactic of linking the civil rights 
movement with the anti-Vietnam-war protest movement . . . King’s exhortation to boycott the















draft and refuse to fight could lead eventually to dangerous displays of civil disobedience and
near-seditious activities by Negroes and whites alike.”3
The assassinations of King and Malcolm X short-circuited what might have been a powerful, unit-
ed movement against the war and for fundamental social change. In the event the mainstream
of the antiwar movement narrowed its focus to a single goal: to end the war in Vietnam.4 The de-
struction of a small Southeast Asian country by the most powerful military machine in the world,
which unfolded daily in the press and on TV screens, never felt ordinary. Rather, it assumed night-
mare proportions, requiring an ever greater need to protest and somehow bring it to an end.
Richard Nixon, like Lyndon Johnson before him, was extremely sensitive to the antiwar move-
ment and monitored it closely. “Realises,” Haldeman noted in his diary for 29 September 1969,
referring to the president, that “war support is more tenuous every day and knows we have to
maintain it somehow.” Fearful of the coming October moratorium, Nixon considered scheduling
a press conference that would “pre-empt coverage of the day’s activities”. The point, Haldeman
told his diary, was to “try to make the innocents see they are being used . . . Hard to do much be-
cause momentum is tremendous and broad based.” The November moratorium – a nationwide
call to suspend ‘business as usual’ in order to protest the war – disturbed Nixon even more. He
thought hard about it and had “helpful ideas like using helicopters to blow their candles out . . .”
Much in the style of his superior’s later observation of the Great Wall of China, that it was a great
wall, Haldeman noted that “the big march turned out to be huge”. Even, “really huge”.5
At the same time, many Americans were often as upset by the demonstrators as by the war. In-
deed, their opposition to the war frequently took the form of urging that the government go ‘in’
or get ‘out’ – in which going in meant the yet more total destruction of Vietnam as a means of
getting out. As George Packer described it in a recent essay, the sixties, “which began in liberal
consensus over the Cold War and civil rights, became a struggle between two apocalyptic poli-
tics that each saw the other as hell-bent on the country’s annihilation. The result was violence
like nothing the country had seen since the civil war . . .”6 Republican politicians skilfully manipu-
lated these enmities (and still do).
Finally, Ho Chi Minh did win. His colleagues and heirs had defeated the world’s pre-eminent mili-
tary power. And the antiwar movement had succeeded as well, if not in ending the war then at
least in contributing to its end. It took more than a decade to achieve this, but the legacies of the
antiwar movement, like the legacies of the war itself, lingered and for a time seemed to have an
effect, albeit limited. The powerful anti-military consensus of the post-war period had a name:
the Vietnam syndrome, which can be defined as a dangerous lack of blood-lust on the part of
the public. Presidents who wished to send troops into combat had to mount determined cam-
paigns to persuade people that such action was necessary. Public expressions of disapproval of
the use of force paused when soldiers were actually deployed, but that did not lessen their im-
pact on politicians and policy-makers.
No US troops were sent to Nicaragua or El Salvador though protests could not prevent mas-
sive military aid to the Contras in Nicaragua or the government of El Salvador. When American
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troops were sent, the administrations involved laboured to make their wars exceedingly brief, 
over almost before they began, and virtually free of American casualties – this was the case in
Grenada, Panama, and Gulf War I. In addition, reliance on air power and the substitution of hu-
man rights for anti-communism as a motive for the use of force worked to fracture the anti-in-
terventionist consensus of the early post-Vietnam years.
At the same time, unexpectedly from the left, predictably from the right, there was a post-Vietnam 
attack on both the political and countercultural aspects of the movement. Todd Gitlin, himself
a major actor in the antiwar movement, rejected what, in retrospect, he considered the move-
ment’s excesses: its divisiveness, its elitism, its disregard for the sensibilities of ordinary Ameri-
cans. He insisted that any antiwar movement in future should separate the war from the warrior 
and “support the troops”. He himself did so during Gulf War I through a very public blood dona-
tion.7 The right, on the other hand, rejected both the political messages of the antiwar movement
and the legacy of the counterculture, locating in the latter a deplorable individualism and con-
sumerism. In the name of individual freedom, public authority had been delegitimised in almost
all arenas of social life with a consequent weakening of democratic institutions. The antibour-
geois utopian movements of the Sixties, such critics argued, destroyed themselves through ex-
cess and violence, only to be born again in the late 70s and 80s as individualistic liberation move-
ments. The roots of the neoconservative movement lie here, in the rejection of both the political 
and cultural remnants of the past.8
Then, in 1989 the US won the Cold War. The triumphalism of the early post-Cold War years set
the stage for the overweening sense of American power that marked the 1990s and the ear-
ly years of the twenty-first century. For conservatives, Vietnam – when they didn’t argue that
the US had in fact won that war – became one lost battle in a 50-year war from which the US
emerged the sole victor. Many on the left, freed of the obligation to be anti-anti-communist,
discovered their inner liberalism, looked upon America and found it, once again. Good. Militant
and militarised humanitarian intervention, even would-be benign imperialism, characterised
the writing of many post-Cold War public intellectuals who had once counted themselves in the 
ranks of the antiwar movement.9
And yet for all these changes, the opposition to George W. Bush’s push for war in Iraq was mas-
sive. Despite the steady barrage of deliberate lies and misinformation about Iraqi nuclear weap-
ons, WMD and Saddam Hussein’s links to 9/11, the demonstrations in February of 2003 were the 
largest in US history. Some months earlier, the ageing Democratic senator from West Virginia,
William Byrd, urging his colleagues to call a halt to Bush’s drive to war, had reminded his col-
leagues: “I recall all too well the nightmare of Vietnam. I recall too well the antiwar protests and
demonstrations, the campus riots, and the tragic deaths at Kent State . . . And I remember all too
well the gruesome daily body counts in Vietnam. The United States was a deeply divided country.”10
Byrd was right but also wrong. The body count, though far lower than during the Vietnam War,
remained gruesome – for both Americans and Iraqis. Antiwar protests and demonstrations and
campus riots, however, did not return. There was a movement against the war in Iraq but its
shape had shifted. No longer spectacular in any sense of that word, it persisted in local efforts in 















cities across the country to oppose the war, bring aid and comfort to veterans, counter the ag-
gressive military recruiters at minority high schools, and organise grassroots support for politi-
cal candidates believed to be ready to bring the Iraq war to an end. Learning from Vietnam, sol-
diers created their own organisation against the war and themselves conducted hearings about
what they had seen and done in Iraq.11 The movement was differently articulated than the move-
ment against the Vietnam War had been and that different articulation made it less visible. The
question then is how to account for that difference.
There were a number of factors. First, instead of the energies of the civil rights movement fuel-
ling outrage against the war in Vietnam, the largest political and social movement of the 1990s
was antiglobalisation, a movement far more powerful and focused in Europe than in the US.
In many European countries, the movement against globalisation made vital connections with 
longstanding antinuclear movements and green parties. By contrast, the antinuclear movement
in the US seems to have disappeared entirely and green parties, such as they are, remain local
and very weak. Antiglobalisation in the US has been a small, diffuse movement with a constitu-
ency limited almost entirely to students and organised labour, the latter far weaker than it was
in the 1960s. In any case, the moral force of antiglobalisation never reached the national propor-
tions of the civil rights movement. 
Secondly, the Vietnam War exploded on the consciousness of Americans as if the country had
been entirely at peace since 1945. To be sure, the war in Korea was massively unpopular, but
that opposition, occurring in a country in the grips of severe political repression of liberals much
less the left, expressed itself almost entirely in polling data and the wholesale repudiation of the
Democratic Party in the 1952 election. After its ambiguous conclusion in 1953, Korea was more
or less forgotten, so that when the US troops were dispatched to Vietnam, the images of Amer-
icans dying and killing in some distant, hitherto unknown country in Asia came not as a reprise
but as a shock. I have noted the constraint imposed on post-Vietnam administrations by the leg-
acy of Vietnam, but the small doses of war in Grenada, Panama, Somalia and Kosovo worked to
undermine the Vietnam syndrome, inuring the public to the regular, albeit modest, use of force
abroad. And when a big war was undertaken – though against a very small power – in Gulf War 
I, it was conducted as an explicit rejection of the Vietnam War. An immediate application of mas-
sive force (rather than incremental); a clear objective (Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait); an exit
strategy and the careful garnering of public support in anticipation of all of the above.
Central to public acceptance of these wars was the elimination of the draft. Christian Appy and
others have pointed out that the Vietnam-era draft was never an equal opportunity threat.12 Then,
as now, the ranks of the military were filled with men (it was only men then) drawn from the
ranks of the poor and the working class. Yet, just the fact of carrying a draft card, of living with the
possibility of being drafted, of having to make an explicit effort to evade the draft, was a powerful
engine of protest – not only on the part of those eligible for the draft but their friends and family.
Throughout the war, draft resistance – from the first public burning of draft cards to the regular 
draft counselling carried out by church and lay groups – was an important element of the move-
ment. Draft resistance took many forms – from efforts to get into the National Guard (now, of
course, no longer an escape) to going to jail or to choosing exile in Canada or Europe.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 18/05/2020 03:03:03 |
72
Reflections on the Anti-war Movement, Then and Now
A volunteer army allows few such public and visible platforms for resistance. Moreover, the
times have changed. Then, young men fleeing to the safety of Canada were welcomed and had
little difficulty, other than homesickness, in making new lives there. Today, members of the vol-
unteer military who have tried to emigrate to Canada in order to avoid deployment or redeploy-
ment to Iraq have been turned back by Canadian authorities; those who managed to enter the
country have been waging an ongoing battle for political asylum – thus far without success. And
while there is a great deal of sympathy and support for these men on the part of pacifist groups, 
the larger public – and the Canadian government – take refuge in the notion that, after all, none
of them were forced into service; all were volunteers. It is not difficult to make the case that 
there is a ‘poverty draft’ in the US: those who volunteer are seldom from the middle class but
rather people who see the army as their best, perhaps their only, chance for an education and 
job training. It does seem to be difficult for the larger public to focus on these men and women
when the overwhelming majority of the population has no connection with them and no fear of 
having to join them either.
Of course, part of the difference between the two antiwar movements is rooted in the differences
between the wars themselves. Protesters could chant for Ho Chi Minh’s victory; it would be difficult 
to chant for Al Qaeda – in Iraq or Afghanistan. Nor did any American seriously worry that the Viet
Cong would land in force on Californian beaches, whereas the threat of terrorist attacks on the US 
is real and abiding. Then too, the Vietnam antiwar movement, in particular its student component,
was energised by its connection to revolutionary movements elsewhere in the world, from Cuba
to Paris, an energy conspicuously lacking in the first year of the twenty-first century.
In the US, the aftermath of the great antiwar demonstrations that tried to stop the Iraq war be-
fore it began was a feeling of complete powerlessness. It was as if people collectively decided
– well, if those demonstrations couldn’t stop them, nothing can. The focus then turned to the
sort of local organising and – here in contrast to the Vietnam era – electoral politics. Of course
organising for particular candidates had been an important part of the Vietnam era as well, but
a substantial segment of the movement spurned working ‘within the system’ and remained out-
side of electoral politics for the entire period. But when the Republicans stole the election in 2000
and then went on to attack key regulatory agencies, threaten fundamental civil liberties, cut the 
taxes of the super-rich, dismantle what was left of the welfare state, stack the Supreme Court
and then declare an illegal war – there was a widespread feeling that taking back the presidency
was essential and that the only way to do it was to organise for the next election. An astonishing 
grassroots movement was built, almost entirely online, and for a while it looked as though the
Democratic Party would be transformed from below into a genuine party of opposition. Led by a
conservative Vermont governor, Harold Dean, mobilised by the organisation MoveOn (founded
in 1998 but coming into its own in 2003–2004), it seemed for a time that a real-life Frank Capa
movie might come true: Mr Dean Goes to Washington and Ends the War.
Instead, Dean’s campaign imploded. Briefly, the campaign of John Kerry, one of the leaders of 
Vietnam Veterans against the War, brought the two wars and opposition to them together. But 
Kerry ran a dreadful campaign, the Republicans fought a clever, dirty race and the war went on. 
Yet, without a visible antiwar movement and despite the fact that most Americans get their news















from partisan cable TV channels, feeling against the war steadily mounted until George W. Bush
and his war rivalled each other in their unpopularity. MoveOn once more helped to organise vot-
ers and, in the election of 2006, the Democrats took back the Congress. It was a repudiation of
the president, his administration and his policies. But it did not end the war. The Democratic ma-
jority was not large enough and the party, as usual, was sufficiently divided so that all efforts to
withdraw funding for the war failed. 
The impact of the antiwar movement and antiwar sentiment in general was then reflected in the
candidacy of Barack Obama, whose early and consistent opposition to the war was part of his
appeal, just as some of Hillary Clinton’s problems were rooted in the fact that she voted for the
war in 2003. In local congressional elections, candidates vied to present their opposition to the
war as earlier and firmer than that of their opponents. In the extraordinary grassroots organising
for Obama during the primaries and then his victory in November 2008, it is possible to see the
success of the electoral efforts of the contemporary antiwar movement, aided, to be sure, by the
collapse of the American economy and, as of this date of writing, relative stability in Iraq.13
Unlike earlier antiwar movements, the movement against the war in Iraq had focused on per-
suading politicians to do the right thing. The few large Washington marches that were held
were directed less on the numbers who marched down Pennsylvania Avenue than on sending
teams of constituents to lobby in Congress for specific measures relating to the war. Defunding
was one, of course, and that did not succeed. But the form in which support for the troops could
now be expressed included legislation strongly opposed by the Bush administration – such as
enlarged educational benefits for veterans and efforts to limit the number of deployments and
extend the time between deployments. Moreover, again as urged the antiwar lobbying groups,
Congress used its subpoena power to investigate a range of abuses associated with the war,
from the conduct and practices of private military contractors such as Blackwater to the im-
mense corruption of Pentagon contracts to corporations such as Halliburton. There were also
direct actions. On 1 May 2008, for example, ports on the West Coast of the US shut down for a
full day in protest against the war. “Cranes and forklifts stood still from Seattle to San Diego,”
William Yardley reported for the International Herald Tribune, “and ships were stalled at sea as
workers held rallies up and down the coast to blame the war for distracting public attention and
money from domestic needs like healthcare and education.” The protest was under-reported by
the press (deep inside the New York Times and in the business section of the Los Angeles Times)
and completely ignored by TV news.14
In many small towns – especially in states in the Northeast – opposition took the form of collec-
tive resolutions against the war, or to impeach Bush, or as in Brattleboro, Vermont, to threaten
to arrest members of the Bush administration as war criminals should they venture a visit. The
town council of Berkeley, California, declared Marine recruiters “uninvited and unwelcome” and
gave free parking spaces – a very rare privilege – to members of a local protest group.15
Finally and perhaps contradictorily, the most significant articulation of the antiwar movement
has been its ever-growing presence online and in the movies. In a sense, the largest compo-
nent of the movement against the war in Iraq was virtual. It took the form of online blogs, news
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groups and petitions which reached millions of people (as many as 50 million according to one
estimate), correcting the mainstream media, introducing new sources of information and new 
ways of understanding US policy. The influence of these blogs on mainstream reporting is evi-
dent from the apology both the Washington Post and the New York Times made to their read-
ers several years ago for having shamelessly followed the administration line on the approach
to the war.16
A number of blogs monitored events in Iraq with the greatest care, offering more realistic as-
sessments of the situation than the relentlessly good news put out by the Bush administra-
tion. It wasn’t the same as marching in the streets, but on a daily basis people got up from their 
computers feeling they had put in rather a full political day, ready to watch the evening news
with appropriate scepticism. Even as the New York Times confined its Iraq news to small arti-
cles deep inside the paper, Common Dreams, Antiwar, the KnightRidder newspapers, AlterNet,
Informed Comment and the Huffington Post kept the war alive and solidly in view. For the first
time a wired general public was able to read – and watch (Al Jazeera is available online) well
outside of the standard sources.
It is too early in the Obama administration to know whether a new antiwar movement will be
necessary. He has committed himself to the full and early withdrawal of troops from Iraq, the
closing of Guantanamo, the end of the torture of prisoners. His policy on Afghanistan remains in 
flux although the decision to dispatch 30,000 more troops remains in place. Yet thus far into the 
new president’s term anyhow, there has been a decided drop in the level of aggressive rhetoric
and the flexing of America’s military muscle. At the same time, anticipating trouble, there is a 
rising chorus of voices urging an end to the war in Afghanistan – online websites, petitions, the
occasional TV interview show. One can hope . . .
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